The central question concerning how mission and ethics are related arises within the context of the understanding of ethics itself and in this way often leads back to the familiar 'indicative and imperative' model. This oversimplified approach, however, is ultimately inadequate for the Pauline ethic in general and for the particular problem concerning mission and ethics. In this article, 1 Corinthians 9 was drawn upon as an example for the 'implicit ethics' model, a model which allows for a more nuanced presentation of the grounds and justification for behaviour and action. Through this approach it became clear that the proclamation of the Gospel does not have to be 'unethical'; rather, it could be located and understood within the realm of the Pauline reflection on conduct. This, in turn, justified speaking of an 'ethic of missions (activity)' in Paul.
Mission versus ethics in 1 Corinthians 9? 'Implicit ethics' as an aid in analysing New Testament texts
The central question concerning how mission and ethics are related arises within the context of the understanding of ethics itself and in this way often leads back to the familiar 'indicative and imperative' model. This oversimplified approach, however, is ultimately inadequate for the Pauline ethic in general and for the particular problem concerning mission and ethics. In this article, 1 Corinthians 9 was drawn upon as an example for the 'implicit ethics' model, a model which allows for a more nuanced presentation of the grounds and justification for behaviour and action. Through this approach it became clear that the proclamation of the Gospel does not have to be 'unethical'; rather, it could be located and understood within the realm of the Pauline reflection on conduct. This, in turn, justified speaking of an 'ethic of missions (activity)' in Paul.
Introduction Mission and ethics -A first approach
Paul was a missionary. There is little doubt concerning this assessment within New Testament (NT) scholarship.
1 Paul was the founder of Christian congregations in Thessalonica, Philippi and Corinth and possessed a zealous interest not only for the existence, but also for the growth, of these communities (e.g. 2 Cor 11:2−3; Phlp 1:6).
But was Paul, at the same time, an ethicist? The Pauline letters are certainly not ethical treatises in the sense of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. However, the apostle does not simply offer concrete advice on behaviour, but he is also reflecting and arguing why a certain way of acting is better than another. His arguments can be understood as general reflections on behaviour. Thus we may find at least an 'implicit ethics' within Paul's writings.
The question remains, how do mission and ethics belong together? Is there any connection at all? Is it the Christians' different way of life, which convinces the outside world more than missionary preaching? Or does Paul simply want to clarify ethical problems within the community itself, having no interest in doing missionary work with an ethical conception? In other words: Can one say that ethics is something for the inner circle of the church, whereas mission, by contrast, is addressed to the outside world? Behind this we detect a contrast between ethics and theology which, for an extended period of time, dominated research on Paul's writings. Many scholars divided the letters, for example, to the Galatians and to the Romans, into two parts: firstly a section on theology, secondly a section on ethics. With regard to our focus we may narrow the division down to, firstly, theology as a missionary act telling the Good News to everyone; secondly, ethics as a pastoral act regulating the daily life of the congregation. Mission versus ethics?
Mission versus ethics in 1 Corinthians 9
In 1 Corinthians 9 Paul addresses questions concerning the lifestyle of early Christian missionaries. He must defend himself, as explicitly stated in 1 Corinthians 9:3, against the accusations of certain opponents who questioned his lifestyle. Concretely stated, the issues concern 'eating and drinking ' (v. 4) , the 'right, to be accompanied by a believing wife ' (v. 5) , and 'working for a living', that is the support of missionaries by the congregation.
These issues simply put, concern practical questions of living. Furthermore, that which makes arguments and discussion necessary is the fact that some controversy existed about how to answer such questions. Paul speaks of 'us' as opposed to 'the other apostles ' (v. 5) . Apparently there are different, even opposing lifestyles of other apostles who raise this practice to the level of a norm and thus require Paul -because of his own practices -to defend himself. 1.See, for instance, the discussions in Peerbolte (2003) , Plummer (2006) , Ware (2005) , and the survey in Kok (2012) .
2.See for a plausible reconstruction of the problem Theißen (1979:201-230) , Pratscher (1979) , and more recently Harnisch (2007:31-32) .
At its root the question actually concerns: What is right conduct? What is good and correct to do, and why? Whoever enters into a dispute concerning the reasons for proper action begins 'to do ethics'. Ethics becomes necessary precisely and especially in situations involving conflict where it is not a priori clear what the right, or the good course of action is in that situation. At this point the justification, explanation and communication concerning presuppositions and criteria for evaluating behaviour becomes necessary.
Paul enters into such a discussion in 1 Corinthians 9. He wrestles with and pursues reasons and arguments that legitimate his conduct, and in this way he is 'doing ethics', or, put another way, he is an ethicist.
Let us consider verses 7−15 more closely. Paul offers two lines of argument, presented in a long series of rhetorical questions, to justify the right to financial support: Firstly, Paul points to examples drawn from 'secular' life and his rhetorical questions seek obvious and undisputed answers. For example, verse 7a: 'Who at any time pays the expenses for doing military service?' Answer: Nobody. It is selfevident that a soldier, vinedresser, or shepherd receives a salary or may live off that which his or her labour produces. This reasoning draws on the ethos of everyday life in order to be convincing. At the same time however, Paul does not offer only human logic (menschliche Logik 3 ), but draws a similar conclusion in referring to the 'Law of Moses' and citing Deuteronomy 25:4. The same principle of the right to support in an agrarian context is also set forth in the Torah. This first line of argument however, ends with Paul indicating that he declined to invoke this right. In verse 13 the apostle returns to the, from his perspective, presumably successful use of rhetorical questions: that which is true for secular work can be applied to religious service. The right to support is also valid for priests and those who serve at the altar. They may secure their livelihood through their service in the temple. This argument is also concluded with a citation; however, in this instance it is not drawn from the Torah, but rather from Jesus. One of the very few citations of Jesus' words by Paul occurs here. This logion too confirms the maxim that a worker may receive wages. Yet, once again the final statement is a refusal to lay claim to such rights (1 Cor 9:15).
Paul in no way disagrees with the right to support. On the contrary, he supports this right through ethical reflection and secures it with appeals to ethos, scripture, and Jesus' words. The carefully constructed ethical argument, however, is discarded based on the proclamation of the Gospel: the gospel alone is the criterion and goal for Paul. In 1 Corinthians 9:12 Paul already makes reference to the 'gospel of Jesus Christ' (εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ) and in 1 Corinthians 9:23 the Gospel is invoked in the summarising conclusion.
Are thus, all behavioural maxims such as Torah, Jesus' words, the ethos of daily life discarded when the preaching of the 3.This translation for κατὰ ἄνθρωπον follows that of Zeller (2010:302) On the one hand, it is indisputable that the letters of Paul prompt a specific type of behaviour, that is, an imperative of behaviour. 4 On the other hand, the unconditional promise of salvation, the grace without 'works of the law', that is, the doctrine of justification, was developed as the core of Pauline theology. Is there not, in this way, an irreconcilable contradiction between the imperative of behaviour and the indicative of salvation? This is not the place to speak further of the subsequent reception of this model as I, amongst others, have sought to do elsewhere (cf. Dunn 1998:626−631; Parsons 1995:217−249; Zimmermann 2007:259−284 • The indicative-imperative pattern introduces an artificial division that retrospectively pulls apart a unity as presented by Paul.
• The model suggests a temporal or logical priority, of whatever kind, of the indicative before the imperative.
• The pattern is reductionistic and inflexible and therefore contradicts the dynamic and multifaceted Pauline rationale for behaviour.
Theology:
The formulation of indicative and imperative leads to unsolvable aporiae with a view towards the validity of Pauline soteriology:
• Does God's gift of salvation have to be validated or perfected by humanity? Is it therefore in some manner incomplete or limited without human action? • What type of (negative) soteriological quality is assigned to the imperative?
4. Speech and moral philosophy:
• Indicative and imperative are metaphors with which no precise, ethical description of the Pauline rationale for action is possible.
• If the terms are conceptually evaluated, their moralphilosophical attribution is problematic since if an imperative ('what ought to be') is derived from an indicative ('what is') the so-called 'naturalistic fallacy' (Moore 1970:41-52 ) is committed.
Returning to 1 Corinthians 9 and the problem of mission and ethics, in the first section of this article I constructed a confrontation between mission and ethics. The resultant attribution: 'Mission = Gospel or Theology = Indicative' and 'Ethics = Imperative' reveals itself, upon closer consideration, as inadequate or even entirely wrong. For Paul, mission is not an indicative of salvation and therefore cannot simply be linked to theology and the salvific promise. Within the term 'mission' one already finds, etymologically speaking, the 'sending' (missio), a clear activity. In the specific case in 1 Corinthians 9 one finds a definitive action (even refusing to act is an act!) on the part of Paul in order to 'do missions'. Philosophically speaking, the difference between 'doing' and 'refraining from doing' is often essentially irrelevant as far as ethics is concerned (cf. Birnbacher 1995) . In each instance one is dealing with a behaviour that is operating within an ethical argument and evaluation framework. Thus, Paul on the one hand, justifies his 'mission occupation' by referring to his refusal of certain activities (eating, drinking, taking along a wife, accepting support), and on the other by pointing to concrete action. At least this must now be clear: a simplistic classification of indicative and imperative breaks down based on the example of 1 Corinthians 9. It also reaches its limits in the problem of mission and ethics. Mission assumes action and behaviour, even if this acting is the passing on of the message of salvation, of the gospel.
The actual problem of indicative and imperative thus actually becomes more acute. If God's salvific promise is fundamentally valid, and is not conditioned by human action, then any acting and mission becomes superfluous. God alone justifies, the indicative removes the imperative of the missionary occupation and in a strict sense even forbids it.
Thus we can confidently affirm: in the light of both general and specific criticisms, within New Testament scholarship and exegesis one should once and for all bid adieu to the indicative-imperative model as the explanatory framework for the correlation of theology and ethics in Paul. In order to avoid misunderstanding, it is important to reiterate that this model presents a methodological approach with which one is able, as precisely as possible, to capture the text-based behavioural rationale and underlying value system of Paul (as well as other texts).
In no way is the model conceived of as one in which the theological basis of Pauline ethics is to be undermined in the sense of ethics versus theology. At the same time however, it should become apparent that, for example, grace, Jesus' words, et cetera are identified as norms for conduct alongside and in connection with other norms. These norms do not stand next to each other, rather, they arise in a certain competition with each other or are arranged in a system of prioritisation. Yet, precisely in this way the specifics of a value system can be recognised in which the Torah is not sweepingly or completely denigrated, as suggested in the over-simplifying indicative-imperative model.
In order to do justice to the nuanced differentiation of ethical discussion (also in the philosophical context), I have selected eight varying perspectives, which I have explained elsewhere (Zimmermann 2010 (Zimmermann :24−28, 2009 Dautzenberg 1969:228; Harnisch 2007:27; Jeremias 1966:289f.) .
On the intertextual level we can pursue the question of the form and genre of the text. The text itself offers a clear hint in verse 3 in that Paul here utilises the term 'apology'. Along with many other exegetes, I understand the verse-concluding αὕτη as a cataphora, that is as a reference to the ensuing. Thus, the entire following discussion is placed under the heading ἀπολογία. The speech here is a defence, in other words, a forensic speech. 7 Correspondingly, one would expect that Paul would refute the accusations of his opponents and thus defend his conduct and his apostleship. And yet, the text apparently does the opposite. Paul defends and proves, rather exhaustively, the right to support and therefore agrees completely with the perspective of his opponents. In order to do so, the form of negative rhetorical questions is chosen with the aim to achieve an agreement on the part of the addressees. The οὐκ εἰμί or μὴ οὐκ presses the hearers to respond: 'But of course he has the right, it is patently obvious that a vinedresser or a priest receives support!' At this point we have arrived at the third level of the linguistic analysis, the level that I have called 'extra-textuality'. What is the pragmatic, the speech act if you will, of this text?
Through his rhetorical proof, Paul brings about the agreement of his addressees concerning the right to support. And yet, instead of following with the corresponding conclusio, that is, something like 'because the right to support has been proven, make sure that from now on you provide me with support!', Paul declares his refusal of this right. In this way it becomes clear that the intention cannot really be to prove 7.So, for instance, Lührmann (1986:309, n. 51) . For a different view, see Mitchell (1991:246) : '1 Corinthians 9 is no defense speech by Paul.' the right to support. Instead, Paul 'irritates' his addressees with his refusal and appeals for their insight into a higher set of values: the duty, even the necessity (ἀνάγκη v. 16) of proclaiming the gospel is more important than the duty to support. The mention of rights and duties, thus indirectly invoking values and norms, leads to the second area of focus.
Norms and maxims for action
Within his argument Paul refers to various different values and norms. A reduction to a single, normative 'salvation indicative' cannot do justice to the text, since Christ, the gospel, or grace are already different norms. With the identification of particular norms (e.g. the Torah) an entire concept of ethical criteria is recalled. This assumes a consensus concerning the recognition of these norms by all parties involved in the communication so that there is no need to justify each one individually. Thus, it is not necessary to further underscore 'freedom' as an ethically relevant norm or that the 'Torah' portrays a particular normative instantiation.
Firstly it is necessary to list descriptively the norms used in 1 Corinthians 9, which is done in Table 1 .
History of traditions in context
The various norms listed above gain their ethical value primarily through the traditional discourse in which they have been established. For this reason it is necessary to consider the tradition-history of the norms in order to be able to determine how a norm is utilised in a particular text. Here, and in an exemplary fashion, I will consider only the first norm, freedom (ἐλευθερία), 8 which is mentioned in both verses 1 and 19 and thus functions as an inclusio for the chapter. In 1 Corinthians, the term ἐλευθερία occurs once (1 Cor 10:29) and ἐλεύθερος six times (1 Cor 7:21f., 39; 9:1, 19; 12:13, cf. also one instance of ἀπελεύθερος in 1 Cor 7:22). Furthermore, there are several instances where 'freedom terms' are utilised, even if the precise word does not appear (e.g. 1 Cor 6:12; 10:23: παντα ἔξεστιν 'all things are lawful'). In almost every instance, the use of these terms stands in material relation to the contrary terms δοῦλος, viz. δουλόω. This contrast between slavery and freedom is traditional and constitutive for the use of the term in the Hellenistic tradition.
Through this tradition-historical perspective it is possible to evaluate Paul's recourse to 'freedom' as an ethical norm. Through the rhetorical questions Paul reveals that he and, in all likelihood, his addressees know the populist conception of external freedom in the sense of freedom from restraint and in the sense of licentiousness (1 Cor 6:12; 10:23; cf. 9:1). Yet, Paul, like in Stoicism, relocates freedom to the internal realm. It is not however autonomy and self-control that confer this inner peace as it is for the Stoics, but rather bondage to Christ.
8.For discussion of this term, see Schlier (1935:484-500) ; Vollenweider (1989) ; Malherbe (1995:231-255) ; Dautzenberg (2001:57-81); and Theißen (2002:357-368 According to the Pauline understanding therefore, the freedom of the Christian is twofold: it is a freedom from norms that could enslave a person (e.g. the desires as in 1 Cor 6:12-20 or the demand for circumcision in Gl 5). At the same time, it is a freedom to a new bondage in the relationship with Christ as it is vividly corporally formulated in 1 Corinthians 6:17-20 (κολλάομαι). The conception of freedom in 1 Corinthians 9 is also to be understood in this way: Paul is free from every duty to support even as he is financially free, that is, 'independent' from the community. But 'though he is free with respect to all he has made himself a slave to all' (see v. 19), so that he may win some for the gospel. In this way freedom is subordinated to the gospel.
Priorities of values
Clearly, freedom is not an absolute value, but rather exists within a hierarchy of values, being slotted above some and below other values. Paul does not receive ethical norms uncritically or simply in a contrastive way, instead they are modified within his arguments, occasionally relativised or criticised, placed in relation to others and hierarchically ordered. That is, they are located within a comparative axiomatic and values ethics. In considering more closely this priority of values in verses 7−14, we can recognise a clear hierarchy of values in the rhetorical design of this section. According to Sundermann (1996:243, 248; also Harnisch 2007:34) , one can outline the verses identified as probatio [proof] according to rhetorical aspects: If one attempts to discover an implicit hierarchy of values within the rhetorical organisation of these norms, one will detect that custom and 'everyday' morality is referred to first, whereas νόμος and λόγος κυρίου are mentioned at the conclusion of the respective subsections with a progressive purpose. If one also recognises the climax within the entire passage, then one can again perceive the higher value of the sacred over the profane and Jesus' words over the Old Testament law. The Jesus logion marks the 'Höhepunkt in der Argumentation' (cf. Galitis 1981:135; Wolff 1990:26) . 9 A rhetorical-compositional analysis of the section also reveals the hierarchy of values of the apostle that stand behind the progression of the argument. This hierarchy, with respect to the previously mentioned norms, is organised as follows: Ethos (profane − sacred) > Torah > The Words of Jesus (Horrell 2005:214f.; cf. Schrage 1995:295, 308 ).
The ethical Logic -argumentationstructure of motives
Yet, what significance do these norms have within the 'implicit ethics' of Paul? Does the refusal of the right on the part of Paul render the above-mentioned norms invalid, making them, in principle, worthless? Is this one more demonstration that for Paul, the contemporary ethos, Jewish law, and even the words of Jesus (viz. a statement of the earthly Jesus, cf. Q/Lc 10:7) have come to the end as normative entities in the light of the gospel?
Even though Paul declares his personal renouncement, he in no way contests the validity of the enumerated norms. Quite the contrary. In my opinion, this becomes evident through various textual indicators: the term διατάσσω [command] , already utilised in the Jesus logion underscores the authority and binding nature of this word, whose lasting validity is further supported through the use of the aorist and the kuriostitle (cf. Schrage 1995:309) . Moreover, the validity of the norms is also underscored in Paul having to defend himself against their persuasiveness in verse 15: 'But I have made no use of any of these rights, nor am I writing this so that they may be 9. Pratscher (1979:285) applied in my case.' Above all, the inner logic of the refusal speaks against any denigration. Only with the continuing validity of the named behavioural norms is the decision by Paul to distance himself from them truly a refusal.
For Paul, however, there are further norms at play that are valued more highly and justify his renunciation. Decisive here is ἐλευθερία, which is already mentioned in the introductory rhetorical question in 1 Corinthians 9:1: Οὐκ εἰμὶ ἐλεύθερος (cf. Popovic 2003) . The freedom of the apostle becomes visible, in the first instance, in his ability to refuse financial support. Paul is, ethically considered, free to subordinate the norms mentioned in 1 Corinthians 9:7-14 to higher values. This freedom though, does not become a deontological norm in itself that necessarily must be obeyed. In no way can freedom in the populist sense be confused with an autonomous unrestricted life. Paul makes the heteronomous character of his 'paradoxen Freiheitsverständnisses' (Theißen 2002:364) unmistakably clear. He does not act according to an autonomous will, but is under -paradoxically formulated -'necessity' (1 Cor 9:16f.) 10 in his freedom namely, the necessity to proclaim the gospel of Jesus Christ. Christian freedom arises out of an 'un-freedom', namely the bond to Christ. At the same time, the freed person is not only δοῦλος Χριστοῦ (1 Cor 7:22), 11 but can also enter into -following the example of Christ 12 -servitude for others: Ἐλεύθερος γὰρ ὢν ἐκ πάντων πᾶσιν ἐμαυτὸν ἐδούλωσα (for though I am free with respect to all, I have made myself a slave to all, 1 Cor 9:19). In the ensuing verses (1 Cor 9:20-22) the precise nature of this servitude is made concrete: Paul is Jew, Greek, under the law, outside the law, in short: he has become all things, in order to save some.
From an ethical vantage point this means that 'freedom' as an end is teleologically set forth towards the goal of gospel proclamation and mission. Thus, freedom -as also indicated in the following: 1 Corinthians 6:12 and 10:23 -finds its determination and its limitation in particular series of action. In 1 Corinthians 9:19-23, the passage under consideration here, the behavioural goal of the freedom norm is 'so that I might win … and might save ' (ἵνα ... κερδήσω, vv. 19-22a, viz. ἵνα πάντως τινὰς σώσω, v. 22) . The orientation towards the gospel is found at the end of the section as a programmatic statement: πάντα δὲ ποιῶ διὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον, ἵνα συγκοινωνὸς αὐτοῦ γένωμαι (1 Cor 9:23).
Mission and a gospel orientation are therefore not set against ethics, but rather become the highest goal in the sense of the aspiration in a teleological ethic, which then motivates conduct. 10. Theißen (2002:358) to a certain extent rightly speaks of a 'Gegenaffekt '. 11.Bryon (2003) has correctly noted that one does not find the designation δοῦλος Χριστοῦ in 1 Corinthians 9, as one does in Romans 1:1; Galatians 1:10; and Philippians 1:1, and that the term οἰκονόμος is not unequivocally synonymous with 'slave'.
12.The intended Imitatio Pauli in 1 Corinthians 9 is rightly, with reference to 1 Corinthians 11:1, tied back to the Imitatio Christi. If the Corinthians follow Paul's example, then ultimately they are following the example of Christ. So Horrell (2005:214-222) ; cf. also the general comments by Merk (1998:302-336) .
13.Significantly, Hays (1996:43) notes concerning the 'telos': 'The telos of such action is not just to enhance personal virtue and humility but also to secure the unity of the Community in Christ.' This goal is expressed concretely, for example, in taking into account the conscience of the weak (cf. 1 Cor 8:13: so as not to cause a brother to stumble), as building up the community: ἵνα ἡ ἐκκλησία οἰκοδομὴν λάβῃ (cf. 1 Cor 1:10; 12:25; 14:12), or as saving Christian brothers and sisters (cf. 1 Cor 9:22; 10:33; 14:5).
Once again, mission is not a formal end in itself but stands in a referential context as seen in the ἵνα-sentence. Ethically regarded, the gospel is altruistically determined in the sense of saving others, that is, the building up of the community.
At this point I would like only to briefly consider the final three aspects.
Moral agent
Firstly, the ethical subject. Whom does the ethical argument concern? Who is the decision maker and the one deciding conduct?
That this question is anything but self-evident is already clear in the Torah citation concerning the ox treading out the grain (Dt 25:4) in 1 Corinthians 9:9. It is debated within New Testament exegesis whether the point here, as apparently in the original meaning of the saying, is a statement about the protection of animals, which portrays the ox as an ethical subject, or whether we are confronted with a metaphorical reapplication that has humanity in view (cf. Brewer 1992) . It seems to me that the latter is more likely in the light of Paul's three questions in 9:9c, 10a and b. Gerd Theißen attempted to show that the claimed norm in the text, namely, that a 'wandering missionary' would receive support, is not at all self-evident. In fact, he contends that the contrary, that is, the full voluntary nature of such work can be shown to be the ethos. It was not at all commonplace to receive support for proclaiming. 14 The opponents of Paul first had to establish this right and raise it to the status of a criterion for apostleship.
Resulting ethos as lived
Furthermore, we can critically question Paul's claimed financial independence in that, according to 2 Corinthians 11:8 and Philippians 4:15, he did in fact receive support from the congregations.
The praxis that can be gleaned from other texts could, in both cases contradict the ethical norms claimed in the text. At the very least, it relativises the right.
Adressee -field of application
Finally, the question can be asked concerning the ultimate point of, or goal in Paul's argument. Who are the actual addressees of this ethical discussion? Is the point Paul's own ethical justification? Hardly, as already evidenced in the appeal of the text. But towards whom then, is the appeal concerning conduct directed? Is Paul's point an attempt to persuade the 'other' apostles of the legitimacy of his own apostleship, which they have doubted?
14.See Theißen (1979) .
This discourse is embedded in 1 Corinthians 8−10, 15 that is, in the debate concerning meat sacrificed to idols, which makes it possible to recognise that Paul is ultimately not concerned either with himself, or with criteria for apostleship but rather the problem with, or the perspective taken towards, meat sacrificed to idols and the resulting role of the strong (and weak) in Corinth. As then explicitly stated in 1 Corinthians 11:1, the strong should follow Paul's example; they are the actual 'ethical addressees' in 1 Corinthians 9. They should not insist on 'their rights' and employ their 'inner freedom' in order to serve others.
Epilogue: The 'implicit ethics' in 1 Corinthians 9 -and: What about ethics and mission?
To conclude: what has been gained through this nuanced analysis? What does the method of 'implicit ethics' have to offer? What does it contribute to the question with which I began concerning mission and ethics?
I hope that at least one thing has become clear, namely that 1 Corinthians 9 reveals a complex, multi-stage ethical argument that cannot be reduced to a simplistic indicative and imperative framework. In addition, a nuanced perspective guards against missteps and errors in the ethical analysis. Deontological norms such as convention, the Torah, and the words of Jesus are not rendered null and void for Paul. Whoever judges Paul in the category of a simplistic value classification scheme (i.e. valuable -valueless) fails to recognise the positive value that the mentioned normative instances continue to have, and indeed must continue to have for Paul's argument. Within a comparative axiology, however, their scope becomes limited and they become teleologically subordinated to particular goals. In 1 Corinthians 9 Paul argues along the lines of a 'practical ethics' or an 'integrative ethics' (cf. Krämer 1995) that intertwines deontological and teleological thinking.
Fundamentally valid norms, based on which particular behaviour can be justified deductively, do exist. This is the case for the rationale of the right of a labourer to a wage as well as with respect to the heteronomous religiously constructed norm of the proclamation of the gospel. At the same time, the ethical evaluation of behaviour must also keep the consequences of that behaviour in view. In this way, the ethical value of certain conduct is determined through its placement within the integration of normative conduct and the results of such conduct.
Since Paul's behavioural justification explicitly functions as an example for the conduct of the Corinthians in the conflict concerning meat sacrificed to idols, one can also conclude that the particular arguments have appealed to a broader, and in a certain sense even universal, validity. This fact is also significant for the evaluation of mission.
15.As Nasuti (1998:246) observes, 'The chapter is now widely recognised as an integral part of the discussion of meat sacrifice to idols found in chaps. 8 and 10. ' Similarly, Mitchell (1991:247) ; Fotopoulos (2003:223) ; Popovic (2003:415-419); and Horrell (2005:170) .
The proclamation of the gospel was for Paul, more significant than the right to support. Yet, even the gospel is neither an end in itself, nor subjugated to Paul's disposition. The terms 'making oneself a slave ' (v. 19: δουλόω σεαυτόν) or the 'sharer ' (v. 23: συγκοινωνός) in the gospel used by Paul should be remembered by certain overzealous missionaries in our own day. The teleological and altruistic ethic of Paul is not conducive for militant evangelisation strategies.
And so I return to the opening question: how are mission and ethics connected? Do mission and ethics have to be distinguished from each other and do they exclude one another? This question is formulated completely erroneously. Mission and ethics are not two realms of conduct that are to be divided as to their content or substance. Ethics -understood, as I have suggested, as 'implicit ethics' -attempts to elucidate the behavioural reasons, norms and arguments that constitute the implicit Pauline theory of conduct. When the reflection concerns mission, then the ethical analysis serves to deepen the understanding of Paul's mission theology. Therefore, we should not speak of 'ethics versus mission' but can better grasp the 'ethics of mission'.
